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Abstract: The paper suggests that both Wittgenstein in his later period and James in the 
Varieties of Religious Experience put forward a view of religious belief which is very close to 
epistemic relativism. This is not to say, however, that they expressly considered the relativ-
ist account of religious belief as a philosophical goal to be pursued. In the interpretation 
proposed in this paper, epistemic relativism is rather a (contingent) by-product of their 
common attitude towards pluralism and anti-reductionism in philosophy.
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1. Preliminary similarities
James and Wittgenstein never met: James died in the United States in 1910; 
Wittgenstein went to Britain in the same period. However, James was one of 
the few writers whose work Wittgenstein read and reread again and again. Not 
only The Principles of Psychology (1890) but also – what really matters for the 
purpose of this paper – The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). Wittgen-
stein read James’ Varieties in 1912, when he was in Cambridge as a student of 
Russell. In a postcard sent to Russell in the same year, Wittgenstein wrote that 
he was reading James’s Varieties of Religious Experience and that it did him a lot 
of good (Wittgenstein 1974: 9). The content of this postcard is well-known and 
has already been analyzed by invoking Wittgenstein’s and James’ personal and 
broadly cultural connections and similarities (Goodman 2002: 11).
Both James and Wittgenstein suffered from morbid fears. In the Varieties, 
James acknowledged himself as in some way a “helpless failure”, and described 
his own morbid fears in the account of an anonymous “correspondent” (James 
1902: 150; Goodman 2002: 40). Not only did Wittgenstein suffer the same kind 
 1  I had the opportunity to discuss an earlier version of this paper at the workshop “James and 
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pecially Anna Boncompagni, Roberto Gronda, and Cheryl Misak, for their comments and suggestions.
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of fears (for example, he once told Drury about his childhood fears, induced 
by a pattern of fallen plaster on the wall of his home’s lavatory, and said that he 
still suffered from these fears while a student at Manchester in 1910), but he was 
also convinced that “only religious feelings are a cure for such fears” (Drury 
1984: 116). Furthermore, both of them described the peculiar religious experi-
ences experienced by “sick souls”, those people for whom evil is something 
essential, which cannot be cured by any superficial change of the environment 
or of the self, but requires a supernatural intervention (James 1902: 127). They 
both described the experience of distress and absolute loneliness, melancholy, 
the perception of failure, the fear of death, the recognition of sin as something 
essential to our life (James 1902; Wittgenstein 1998). Both greatly admired Tol-
stoy and focused on his conversion and on the peculiar experience that led to it. 
During the First World War, Wittgenstein found Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief in a 
small bookshop, and he started reading it on September 1914. Then he carried 
it with him at all times, memorizing passages of it by heart. He became known 
to his comrades as “the man with the gospels”, and he constantly recommended 
the book to anyone who was troubled. Also Tolstoy’s Confession had a great 
influence on him. Tolstoy’s Confession: one of James’ main documents in the 
Varieties. James presented Tolstoy’s case to show that deep melancholy or de-
spair may be followed by conversion (James 1902: 140). Finally, both Wittgen-
stein and James were interested in religion as something personal rather than 
as something related to religious institutions. The topic of the Varieties were 
religious feelings and impulses, to be investigated by studying those subjec-
tive phenomena that are recorded in works of piety and autobiography (James 
1902:  12; see also 440). Similarly, in his 1929 Lecture on Ethics Wittgenstein 
said that religion (as much as ethics) is, above all, “an entirely personal matter” 
(Wittgenstein 1993: 41). This explains why at the end of the lecture he found it 
essential to speak in the first person (Waismann 1965: 16).
Beside such personal and broadly cultural similarities, there is also a sig-
nificant philosophical agreement between James and Wittgenstein on religion. 
Both James in the Varieties and Wittgenstein in the Tractatus described and 
to a certain extent accepted a form of mysticism. Lectures XVI and XVII of 
the Varieties are dedicated to mysticism. In James’ view religious experience is 
deeply rooted in mystical states of consciousness, though he recognized that he 
could speak of such states only at second hand (James 1902: 342). This notwith-
standing, in the Varieties he presented a list of the features of mystical states: 
ineffability, noetic quality, transiency, passivity. As is well-known, in the Trac-
tatus Wittgenstein spoke of the Mystical. According to the Tractatus’ austere 
conception of language, meaningful sentences can do nothing but describe, or 
misdescribe, facts; such sentences ultimately are combinations of names, that is, 
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words that name objects (Wittgenstein 1953, I: § 1). Only descriptive sentences 
(which are pictures of states of affairs and can be true or false) can be meaning-
ful. Thus, every non-descriptive “sentence” is strictly speaking senseless (it is 
not a sentence proper). In particular, all religious matters belong to the sphere 
of “what cannot be said”. Therefore “one must be silent” about such things, 
even though they are the most important aspects of life, and those that mat-
tered most to Wittgenstein himself (Wittgenstein 1971: § 7). In a word: based 
on a revolutionary theory of meaning, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein agreed with 
James that mystical truths are ineffable (Hyman 2001: 4).
All this is well-known, but it concerns above all the connection between 
James’ in the Varieties and the early Wittgenstein. However, not only did 
Wittgenstein keep on admiring James throughout his life (Drury 1984: 106) 
but, perhaps more importantly, in his post 1929 writings and lectures he also 
shared with James a fundamental philosophical attitude, which might be called 
“pluralism”: both James and (the later) Wittgenstein thought that philosophy 
should describe a great variety of phenomena and be aware of the differences, 
rather than attempting to find general and reductive theories (for a compari-
son between James’ and Wittgenstein’s philosophical attitudes, with a special 
concern for issues related to ethics, see Marchetti 2015: 256 ff.; for a general 
overview, Misak 2016: Ch. 7).
Russell Goodman has noticed that the point of origin for the proliferation 
of the term “pluralism” “in English language metaphysics and epistemology at 
the turn of the nineteenth century is William James” (Goodman 2012: 155). 
Goodman has listed several senses in which James employs the terms “plural-
ism” and “pluralistic”: pluralism as indeterminism; extractive pluralism, ac-
cording to which any entity might have been removed from the world universe 
while everything else remains the same; entity pluralism, the claim that there 
are many particulars, each of which is unique; scheme pluralism, the view 
that there are many correct descriptions of the world; point of view pluralism, 
which holds that there are incommensurable points of view on the universe, 
each of which equally legitimate; and ethical pluralism, according to which 
there are different but equally valid systems of values, and we should respect 
all of them. One might say that pluralism (variously conceived) is not a feature 
among others, but the centre and meaning of James’ philosophy. Moreover, 
James’ pluralism was radical. For example, in a 1910 letter to Minot Judson 
Savage he wrote: “All that my pluralism contends for is that there is no where 
extant a complete gathering up of the universe in one focus, either of knowl-
edge, power, or purpose. Something escapes, even from God” (cited in Good-
man 2012: 155). Pluralism is also, for James, a way of conceiving humankind 
and its place in the universe. He did not believe that human experience is the 
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highest form of experience in the universe; rather, he thought that we stand 
in a similar relation to the whole of the universe as our canine and pets do to 
the whole of human life: “They inhabit our drawing-rooms and libraries. They 
take part in scenes of whose significance they have no inkling. They are merely 
tangent to curves of history the beginnings and ends of which pass wholly 
beyond their ken” (James 1907:  619). This attitude is related to the kind of 
pluralism that Goodman labels “scheme pluralism”: according to James, there 
is no ringing answer to the question, Which of these schemes is the true one? 
Rather, each point of view (common sense, science, philosophy, religion) is 
better for one sphere of life or another (James 1907: 569; see also 116). For the 
purposes of this paper, it is also important to notice that in James’ view plural-
ism is strictly connected to anti-reductionism, and the latter is in turn related 
to tolerance: pluralism
absolutely forbids us to be forward in pronouncing on the meaninglessness of forms 
of existence other than our own; and it commands us to tolerate, respect, and indulge 
those whom we see harmlessly interested and happy in their own ways, however un-
intelligible these may be to us. Hands off: neither the whole of truth nor the whole of 
good is revealed to any single observer, although each observer gains a partial superi-
ority of insight from the peculiar position in which he stands. Even prisons and sick-
rooms have their special revelations. It is enough to ask of each of us that he should 
be faithful to his own opportunities and make the most of his own blessings, without 
presuming to regulate the rest of the vast field (James 1899: 264).
In Wittgenstein’s later philosophy pluralism is not only a general attitude 
but also a methodological orientation, strictly connected to a radically anti-re-
ductionist philosophical anthropology. An important source of Wittgenstein’s 
pluralism is the idea that in philosophy “we must do away with all explana-
tion, and description alone must take its place” (Wittgenstein 1953, I: § 109). 
The following is but a short list of countless remarks expressing Wittgenstein’s 
pluralist attitude in the Philosophical Investigations, an attitude which is sum-
marized in King Lear’s dictum, “I’ll teach you differences” (in fact, at a certain 
point Wittgenstein thought that that sentence could be a good motto for his 
book) (Drury 1984: 157; on this issue see Boncompagni 2016: 263 ff.): “But 
what does this mean? Well, it may mean various things…” (Wittgenstein 1953, 
I: § 6); “in fact we do the most various things with our sentences” (§ 26); “it is 
possible to be interested in a phenomenon in a variety of ways” (§ 108); “well, 
there is a variety of cases here” (1953, II: 211), and so forth. In a similar vein, 
Wittgenstein often presents pluralism as opposed to dogmatism. For instance, 
he compares “the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the various ways 
in which we use them”, on the one hand, with the dogmatic descriptions of the 
 JAMES AND WITTGENSTEIN ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF 79
structure of language provided by logicians, including the author of the Tracta-
tus Logico-Philosophicus on the other hand (1953, I: § 23). He famously writes:
Don’t say: ‘There must be something common, or they would not be called “games”’ 
– but look and see whether there is anything common to all. – For if you look at them 
you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and 
a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look! – Look for example at 
board-games, with their multifarious relationships (§ 66).
These considerations bring us naturally to the Wittgensteinian notion of 
family resemblance (1953, I: § 67), which – as commentators have noted (Good-
man 2002: 53; Hallett 1977: 40; Baker and Hacker 1980: 325) – was anticipated 
by James in the Varieties. Consider, in particular, the following passage:
[T]he word ‘religion’ cannot stand for any single principle or essence, but is rather 
a collective name. The theorizing mind tends always to the over-simplification of its 
materials. This is the root of all that absolutism and one-sided dogmatism by which 
both philosophy and religion have been infested. Let us not fall immediately into a 
one-sided view of our subject, but let us rather admit freely at the outset that we may 
very likely find no one essence, but many characters which may alternately be equally 
important in religion (James 1902: 32).
The oversimplifications of the theorizing mind, one-sided dogmatism, sec-
tarian scientism: these are Wittgenstein’s and James’ common targets in phi-
losophy, in particular, as I shall attempt to show in the following parts of this 
paper, in the philosophy of religion. My main aim in what follows is to compare 
certain aspects of James’ views on religious belief in the Varieties with Witt-
genstein’s later remarks on the gulf between (a certain kind of) believers and 
non-believers, and to claim that in both Wittgenstein and James we may find 
all the ingredients – some explicit, some more implicit – of a kind of factual 
epistemic relativism (see Coliva 2010: 188 for a distinction between factual and 
virtual relativism). For dialectical reasons, I shall first consider an interpreta-
tion I do not agree with, namely, that presented by Richard Rorty in a 2004 
article entitled Some Inconsistencies in James’ Varieties, and I shall provide the 
reasons why I do not agree with it.
2. “More than just a pragmatist”
According to Rorty (2004: 86), James’ book “is riddled with inconsistencies. 
These are not merely incidental. They stem from James’s inability to make up 
his mind between arguing that supernaturalism might be true because it might 
be good for you and arguing that it is in fact true because there is ample experi-
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ential evidence for it”. In Rorty’s view, the main inconsistency depends on, and 
is revealed by, the ambiguous ways in which James’ uses the terms “religious” 
and “experience”. This is clear, for example, when James tries to answer the 
following questions:
“Would it still count as being religious if one regarded this divine soul as ‘a mere 
quality like the eye’s brilliancy or the skin’s softness’ rather than as ‘a self-conscious 
life like the eye’s seeing or the skin’s feeling?” – “Are the causes of religious experience 
entirely irrelevant to their value for human life, or do we have empirical evidence that 
these experiences have a supernatural cause, and therefore reason to believe in the 
existence of an entity unknown to natural science?” (Rorty 2004: 86).
Rorty suggests that in the Varieties there are two different and incompatible 
kinds of answer to such questions. On the one hand, in one selection of pas-
sages, James plays the role of a natural theologian, an empirical enquirer who 
studies human experience and is in a position to conclude for the existence of 
a self-conscious nonhuman life as we do for the existence of material objects 
(tables, islands, penguins). On the other hand, another selection of passages 
leads to an entirely different reading of the book, a reading in which James 
seems to be indifferent to the question of the existence of God, whereas he is 
concerned with how people can cope with despair and depression (86). Look-
ing at this second set of passages, we are induced to reduce James’ saving ex-
periences (and the wider self through which they come) either to the believer’s 
subconscious self (Freud) or to the community of causes and consequences in 
which we are involved (Dewey) (Rorty 2004: 86). In Rorty’s view, the former 
interpretation of the book – James as a natural theologian – is supported by 
the sort of passages that occur in abundance at the end of the Conclusions: a 
paradigmatic case of this sort of passages is James’ remark that “Religion, in 
her fullest exercise of function, is not a mere illuminator of facts already else-
where given, not a mere passion, like love, which views things in a rosier light. 
[…] It is something more, namely, a postulator of new facts” (1902: 462). This 
remark seems to tell us that religious experiences support what James calls an 
“over-belief”, that is, the view according to which the natural constitution of 
the world makes materialism false (1902: 462-463). Rorty maintains, however, 
that the latter interpretation – James as a pragmatist who takes a more caution-
ary stance, similar to the one he adopted in The Will to Believe – is supported 
by those passages, especially in the first chapters, in which James makes the 
following points (here expressed in Rortyan terms): both science and religion 
may be useful, but there cannot be any conflict between different practical 
results; the question, Which of the two corresponds to the way in which the 
world really is?, is a bad one (Rorty 2004: 88-89). According to such pure prag-
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matism, the term “religious” is just a synonym for “vitally important to a per-
son’s self-image”, and there is no significant difference between “total reactions 
upon life” that are religious and those that are not. Nietzsche’s total reaction is 
not less religious than Arnold’s or Emerson’s. And there is no sharp divide be-
tween Stoic, Buddhist and Christian saints’ feelings and behaviour, on the one 
hand, and atheistic moralists’ attitudes and conduct, on the other hand (89-90).
Rorty seems to suggest that the tension he sees in the Varieties depends 
on James’ failure to understand that the purely pragmatic view, the reduc-
tion of experiences to their practical effects, is as incompatible with medical 
materialism, according to which many religious experiences are caused by a 
chance surplus of serotonin and are mere symptoms of mental pathology, as it 
is incompatible with theological supernaturalism, according to which religious 
experiences are caused by an immaterial entity (which is itself the remote ef-
ficient cause of a rearrangement of neural impulses) (Rorty 2004: 91). It goes 
without saying that Rorty takes side with the former, purely pragmatic view. 
Not only does he think that this kind of reductive pragmatism is similar to 
Dewey’s redefinition of “religious” (according to which the term applies as 
much to Arnold and Emerson as to Nietzsche or Marx), but he is also con-
vinced that such a view is shared by Wittgenstein, Sellars, Brandom, and Den-
nett, whose pragmatism is entirely disconnected from empiricism and there-
fore has no metaphysical shortcomings, no views about what is really real (94). 
According to Rorty, James fully belongs to this purely pragmatic tradition, in 
which what really matters to religious life is whether the belief in God is use-
ful to the believer. However, in the Conclusions of the Varieties, he betrays his 
pragmatism, since he deals with the question of the existence of God (a ques-
tion which a pure pragmatist should consider as utterly irrelevant) and seems 
to think that it can be answered by providing sufficient evidence (the kind of 
evidence provided by the experiences of religious virtuosi), so that it becomes 
rational to admit that naturalism is false (95).
It seems to me that Rorty is right when he says that James in the Varieties 
is “more than just a pragmatist” (96). However, I see two main problems with 
his interpretation. First, Rorty attributes a clear inconsistency to a great phi-
losopher: not a hidden, subtle inconsistency, but a clear, obvious one. Under 
Rorty’s interpretation, James would be at the same time a reductive pragmatist 
and a supernaturalist, that is, one who thinks that the experiences of religious 
believers provide evidence sufficient to make it rational to give up naturalism. 
This kind of inconsistency lacks any subtlety, because a supernaturalist in this 
sense is, straightforwardly, not a pragmatist at all.
Secondly, Rorty interprets James’ and Wittgenstein’s views as a sort of re-
ductive pragmatist, but this is incompatible with their deeply rooted pluralism 
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and antireductionism, which many interpreters consider as a central feature 
or trademark of their philosophies. If James had been a reductive pragmatist 
in Rorty’s sense, he would have simply considered the term “religious” as a 
synonym for “vitally important to a person’s self-image”. This would have been 
nothing but a reduction of religious belief in non-religious terms. But pluralism 
is constitutively anti-reductionist. And pluralism – conceived of as the attempt 
to describe the varieties of religious experiences in a non-dogmatic, hence non-
theoretical, way – is perhaps the main point of the Varieties.
Even more importantly, it can be shown in the text that, pace Rorty, in the 
Varieties James is not a reductive pragmatist. For example, at one point James 
claims that, if one accepts the “principle of pragmatism” (that is, Peirce’s prin-
ciple that a belief is significant insofar as it has practical consequences), then 
one may decide “among various attributes set down in the scholastic inventory 
of God’s perfections, whether some be not far less significant than others” 
(James 1902: 399-400). James concludes that God’s moral attributes (holiness, 
omnipotence, omniscience, justice, love, and unalterability) are much more sig-
nificant than God’s metaphysical attributes (aseity, necessariness, immaterial-
ity, simplicity, indivisibility, actual infinity, and so forth), because the former, 
but not the latter, “enter into connection with our life” and “positively deter-
mine fear and hope and expectation, and are foundations for the saint life” 
(401). Throughout the book he never says, however, that, say, Tolstoy’s belief 
in God’s omniscience and holiness is nothing but a set of natural attitudes, 
feelings and emotions, which Tolstoy has. James, as a pluralist, clearly acknowl-
edges that a believer such as Tolstoy believes, first of all, that God exists and 
is a Person, and – as a pluralist – he is interested in describing Tolstoy’s beliefs 
and attitudes, rather than in reducing the former (the beliefs) to the latter (the 
emotional, non-cognitive attitudes).
In the Varieties, James presents his own pluralism as opposed to the sectar-
ian scientific attitude (a reductionist attitude, by the way), and he describes it 
as the persuasion “that the world of our present consciousness is only one out 
of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must 
contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also”. This pluralistic 
attitude, he makes clear, is not a philosophical preference among others, but 
rather it is strictly associated with “the whole drift of [his] education” (463).
Moreover, James explicitly rejects Leuba’s reductionist view, according to 
which “Does God really exist?”, “How does he exist?”, “What is he?” are ir-
relevant questions, and according to which the end of religion is nothing but 
a richer and more satisfying life (Leuba 1901; James 1902: 453). The reason 
why he does not accept such a view has to do with the objective truth of the 
believers’ beliefs. The term “truth” in this context – James is clear about that 
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– is “taken to mean something additional to bare value for life” (456). In fact, 
believers all agree that the “more”, with which their selves in the religious 
experience come into relation, really exists, and it acts and changes their lives 
(for the better) (456): as a pluralist, he can’t help emphasizing all this. Similarly, 
he also writes that the positive content of religious experience is “literally and 
objectively true” (460).
2. Epistemic relativism
Rorty rightly points out that there is a tension in the Varieties. However, he 
does not identify the real tension. First, James does not think that, as Rorty 
would say, “the experiences of religious virtuosi provide evidence sufficient 
to make it only rational for naturalists to give up their naturalism”. He thinks, 
rather, that the experiences of religious virtuosi provide evidence sufficient to 
make religious virtuosi themselves believe that naturalism is false. “Evidence” 
is the keyword here, for James is convinced that religious virtuosi’s beliefs are 
somewhat justified: this is not to say, however, that according to him it is strictly 
speaking rational for religious believers to reject naturalism. Religious experi-
ence is not ordinary experience, and it does not provide ordinary (let alone 
scientific) reasons to believe. Nonetheless, it is experience, after all; and, after 
all, it provides reasons or grounds to believe (see 1902: 22).
In the Varieties James is, as Rorty would say, more than just a pragmatist, but 
not because he is at the same time a Rortyan reductionist and a supernaturalist. 
The reason why he is more than a pragmatist is rather, as I shall claim in what 
follows, that he is a special sort of epistemic relativist. Here I am employing the 
following notion of epistemic relativism, borrowed from Coliva (2010: 202-203): 
epistemic relativism is the view according to which there could be, either in prin-
ciple or as a matter of fact, one epistemic system (that is, either a central core of 
beliefs in hinge propositions – those “basic” propositions that stand fast for us, 
and provide a condition for other propositions to make sense – or a set of meth-
ods and criteria of justification), call it B, alternative to (or even incompatible 
with) our own epistemic system, call it A; systems A and B are equally correct; 
we, who adopt A, are able to understand B but, if we met people who adopt B, we 
could not rationally persuade them to abandon some of their hinges in favour of 
ours; nonetheless, we should not revise our translation of some of their words. In 
the interpretation I am putting forward, epistemic relativism is not a view which 
James explicitly holds in the book; it is just a somewhat implicit by-product of 
his radical pluralism and anti-reductionism. I am not suggesting, however, that 
pluralism entails epistemic relativism. My claim is rather that, as a matter of fact, 
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in the Varieties we find all the main ingredients of a form of epistemic relativism, 
whose main source is James’ pluralist and anti-reductionist attitude.
First of all, in the picture provided by James in the Varieties there are two 
alternative, in fact, incompatible systems of beliefs. Naturalists (non-believers) 
and religious believers (e.g., Tolstoy) have incompatible beliefs: for instance, 
“God exists and produces immortality”, on the one hand, and “God doesn’t 
exist and I have doubts on immortality”, on the other hand. Of course, such 
beliefs would not be strictly speaking incompatible, if they were reducible in 
terms of attitudes towards life. Beliefs, not attitudes, can be compatible or in-
compatible in this sense. However, that James’ is not an expressivist view of 
credal statements is clear not only when he says that almost every religious 
believer has the over-belief “that the God with whom, starting from the hither 
side of our own extramarginal self, we come at its remoter margin into com-
merce, should be the absolute world-ruler”; but also, and more significantly, 
when he writes the following (quoted also by Rorty, disapprovingly):
Religion, in her fullest exercise of function, is not a mere illumination of facts al-
ready elsewhere given, not a mere passion, like love, which views things in a rosier 
light. It is indeed that, as we have seen abundantly. But it is something more, namely, 
a postulator of new FACTS as well. The world interpreted religiously is not the mate-
rialistic world over again, with an altered expression; it must have, over and above the 
altered expression, a natural constitution different at some point from that which a 
materialistic world would have. It must be such that different events can be expected 
in it, different conduct must be required (1902: 463).
Moreover, the two alternative systems are in a broad sense “epistemic”, 
for James thinks that the believers’ beliefs are somewhat legitimate, justified, 
though they rest on entirely different grounds (or reasons) from the non-be-
lievers’ beliefs. This, as is well-known, is one of the main claims put forward by 
James in The Will to Believe, but the same claim can be found in the Varieties, 
for example when James describes Tolstoy’s conversion as something justified, 
rather than genetically explained, by religious experiences. All the book is 
an attempt to describe the variety of such religious experiences, conceived of 
as special, not-ordinary grounds to believe. “Special”, “not-ordinary”: that is, 
strictly speaking, neither empirical nor logical.
As a pragmatist, James is an anti-foundationalist, and this is enough to 
conclude that in his view one system of beliefs is not more correct than the 
other one (or perhaps: one set of standards of justification is not more correct 
than the other).
However, the claim that, according to James, believers and non-believers 
understand each other, at least in part, requires a bit more elaboration. One 
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might think that, since James speaks of mysticism, we should conclude that 
the believers’ grounds are entirely unintelligible for non-believers. If this were 
the case, James would not be an epistemic relativist in the sense employed in 
this paper. However, we should not draw this conclusion too quickly. First, 
even of mystical states, it is somewhat possible to speak, though only indirectly 
(1902: 342). Secondly, in James’ view there are different grades of mysticism: 
as it were, different steps on the “mystical ladder”, from the less mysterious 
and more intelligible ones to the more mysterious and almost unintelligible. 
Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, James clearly states that religious 
experiences can be partly or even entirely not-mystical: the book describes 
plenty of them. In the Introduction he expressly uses the word “intelligible” to 
characterize the account of a religious experience given by a religious believer 
(12). Finally, even though believers and non-believers understand each other 
(at least to a certain extent), in cases of religious “disagreement” rational per-
suasion is excluded, since religious belief is based on experiences that come 
when they come, like unexpected gifts. This is shown, for example, in the de-
scription given by James of the experience he calls “the passion of love”, which 
(together with other experiences) provided Tolstoy with grounds to believe: 
“The passion of love is the most familiar and extreme example of this fact. If 
it comes, it comes; if it does not come, no process of reasoning can force it”. 
And the same for “fear, […] indignation, jealousy, ambition, worship. If they 
are there, life changes. And whether they shall be there or not depends almost 
always upon non-logical, often on organic conditions. And as the excited inter-
est which these passions put into the world is our gift to the world, just so are 
the passions themselves GIFTS – gifts to us, from sources sometimes low and 
sometimes high; but almost always nonlogical and beyond our control” (141).
The last point I would like to make in this paper, and that which I shall focus 
upon in what follows, is that the kind of (partly implicit) epistemic relativism 
which I have just attributed to James in the Varieties can also be found in Witt-
genstein’s later remarks on religious belief. Wittgenstein makes a distinction 
between two kinds of religious believers. The paradigmatic case of the former 
kind of believer is, once again, Tolstoy (Wittgenstein 1998: 84; 1966: 56); the 
paradigmatic case of the latter kind of believer is that Father O’Hara who in 
1930 took part in a symposium on Science and Religion: “one of those people 
who make it [i.e., religion] a question of science” (Wittgenstein 1966: 57), a 
superstitious, rather than religious, man, whose beliefs are misleadingly based 
on allegedly rational and empirical evidence (59). Interestingly enough, both 
James and Wittgenstein have the same extremely negative, vehement attitude 
towards this latter kind of believers, and for the same reasons. Wittgenstein 
says that what was “ludicrous about O’Hara” was “his making it appear to 
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be reasonable” (58), whereas on the contrary we should definitely call him 
“superstitious” and “unreasonable” (59). In James’ thought a role similar to 
that of Wittgenstein’s O’Hara is somewhat played by W.K. Clifford, who had a 
similarly narrow view of what a justified belief could be (though, of course, it is 
likely that Clifford did not share any O’Hara’s religious beliefs). In the Varieties 
James writes: “I CAN, of course, put myself into the sectarian scientist’s atti-
tude, and imagine vividly that the world of sensations and of scientific laws and 
objects may be all. But whenever I do this, I hear that inward monitor of which 
W.K. Clifford once wrote, whispering the word ‘bosh!’ Humbug is humbug, 
even though it bear the scientific name…” (James 1902: 463).
Wittgenstein’s epistemic relativism arises from his conviction that there is 
a gulf between the Tolstoy kind of believer and a non-believer (Tripodi 2013, 
on which the following interpretation of Wittgenstein’s view of religious belief 
is largely based). For example, when the former, but not the latter, believes in 
the Last Judgement, they do not believe the same thing, but – as Wittgenstein 
(1966: 55) puts it – they do not believe different things either. Their distance 
from one another is so great that there cannot be a real disagreement between 
them. It is worth noting, here, that in Wittgenstein’s view the gulf between Tol-
stoy and the non-believer does not have a linguistic nature. In his 1938 lectures, 
Wittgenstein explicitly rejected the idea that there is linguistic incommensura-
bility between the two alternative systems of beliefs. He presented as follows 
the view according to which the gulf between believers and non-believers is to 
be explicated in terms of linguistic incommensurability: “It isn’t a question of 
my [as a non-believer] being anywhere near him [the Tolstoy kind of believer], 
but on an entirely different plane, which you could express by saying: ‘You 
mean something altogether different, Wittgenstein’” (1966:  53). And he im-
mediately rejected it: “The difference might not show up at all in any explana-
tion of meaning” (53). This entails – as Wittgenstein made clear in the incipit 
of the Blue Book – that the difference in question might not be a difference 
of meaning at all (1958: 1). Moreover, and more importantly, Wittgenstein did 
not replace the Tractatus doctrine that religious truths are ineffable with an ex-
pressivist view of religious beliefs, according to which credal statements have 
the apparent form of descriptive assertions but, in fact, are nothing but ex-
pressions of certain emotional and behavioral attitudes (see Braithwaite 1971 
and Nielsen 2005 for a different interpretation). In other words, adapting the 
Rortyan vocabulary seen above: Wittgenstein never accepted a purely pragma-
tist and reductive view of religious beliefs; according to him, credal statements 
say what they say, rather than what is said by reductive translations of their 
words. This interpretation is supported by several passages in Wittgenstein’s 
later remarks on religious belief. There are remarks in which Wittgenstein 
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appears to take religious beliefs at face value. For example: “If he did not rise 
from the dead, then he decomposed in the grave like every human being. He 
is dead and decomposed. In that case he is a teacher, like any other & can no 
longer help; & we are once more orphaned & alone” (1998: 38). And there are 
also passages in which he rejects the expressivist account of the linguistic gulf 
between believers and non-believers. For example, in the 1938 lectures on re-
ligious belief he discussed the case in which “someone, before going to China, 
when he might never see me again, said to me: ‘We might see one another after 
death’”. At one point, Casimir Lewy, who attended the class, commented: “In 
this case, you might only mean that he expressed a certain attitude”. Witt-
genstein replied: “I would say ‘No, it isn’t the same as saying ‘I’m very fond of 
you’ – and it may not be the same as saying anything else. It says what it says. 
Why should you be able to substitute anything else?” (1966, 70-1). Thus, he 
expressly rejected the reduction of credal statements in terms of sentences that 
express attitudes (Schroeder 2007: 446; Kusch 2011). Something similar hap-
pened in a discussion with one of his Catholic pupils, namely, Yorick Smythies. 
When Wittgenstein remarked that by employing a sentence such as “God’s eye 
sees everything”, a believer associates a particular use with a picture, Smythies 
reacted, being worried by Wittgenstein’s proposing a reduction of religion in 
non-religious terms. Wittgenstein, in turn, replied passionately:
Rubbish. I meant: what conclusions are you going to draw? etc. Are eyebrows going 
to be talked of, in connection with the Eye of God? ‘He could just as well have said 
so and so’—this [remark] is foreshadowed by the word ‘attitude’. He couldn’t just as 
well have said something else. If I say he used a picture, I don’t want to say anything he 
himself wouldn’t say. I want to say that he draws these conclusions. Isn’t it as important 
as anything else, what picture he does use? (1966: 71).
In a similar way as James, Wittgenstein seemed to regard reductionism (as 
well as dogmatism and anti-pluralism) not as an unsuitable philosophical view 
among others, but rather as the most serious philosophical sin.
Wittgenstein is an epistemic relativist because he thinks that the gulf be-
tween Tolstoy and a non-believer is epistemological rather than linguistic. He 
draws an epistemological distinction between the evidence of the heart, which 
provides grounds for religious belief, and rational and empirical evidence, 
which provides grounds for our ordinary, scientific, and philosophical beliefs. 
He also thinks that the two kinds of grounds lead to incompatible conclusions 
(1998: 89). Tolstoy’s religious beliefs, Wittgenstein tells us, are based “on evi-
dence which taken in one way would seem exceedingly flimsy” (1966: 57-8), 
where “taken in one way” seems to mean the same as “taken in the in the ordi-
nary sense”, that is, as logical or empirical evidence. And he explicitly stresses 
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that the controversies between a Tolstoy kind of believer and a non-believer 
“look quite different from any normal controversies” because “reasons look 
entirely different from normal reasons” (1966:  55-56, italics mine). Religious 
belief cannot be the result of ordinary evidence: even ordinary indubitability 
would not be enough in that case (1966: 57; 1998: 61).
In Wittgenstein’s view, only experiences such as passion and love can bring 
about such a radical change in one’s life (1998: 61; see also 38-39). According 
to him, religious experiences such as passion, love, despair, the perception of 
failure, melancholy, the recognition of sin (and all the varieties of religious 
experience described by James in his book) provide the believer with reasons 
to believe (though such reasons “look entirely different from normal reasons”). 
For instance, “the wonder at the existence of the world” can bring faith by 
making one inclined to say, “how extraordinary that anything should exist” 
(1993: 41); “the experience of feeling absolutely safe” can bring faith by mak-
ing one inclined to say “I’m safe, whatever happens” (Malcolm 1984: 58); the 
experience of distress and absolute loneliness can make one lose “his dignity as 
someone special & so become like a child” (1998: 52), so as to start feeling the 
need of God’s help, and so forth. It is worth noting, here, that though, as James 
puts it, when the religious belief comes, it comes (like a gift), we are somewhat 
free to accept or reject certain experiences as grounds for believing, or so it 
seems (Wittgenstein 1998:  35). This is a further reason to conceive of such 
basic religious experiences as reasons, rather as mere causes, of religious belief.
Similarly to James, Wittgenstein thinks that the believer’s grounds are 
partly opaque to the non-believer (1966: 56), but he is also convinced that a 
sensitive non-believer (like Wittgenstein himself or perhaps like James, for ex-
ample) has a partial but quite deep understanding of the believer’s grounds. 
He also agrees with James that there are different degrees of religiosity and, ac-
cordingly, different levels of understanding of religious matters (Wittgenstein 
1998: 37). For a non-believer, understanding the believer’s reasons is extremely 
difficult, rather than impossible (37, 84).
As in the case of James’ Varieties, in Wittgenstein’s later remarks on reli-
gious belief we find all the ingredients of a sort of epistemic relativism: two 
alternative and incompatible systems of beliefs, based on entirely different 
kinds of reasons, so that the gulf between the two systems is epistemologi-
cal, rather than linguistic; moreover, non-believers cannot rationally persuade 
believers, though they understand each other, at least in part. As it happens 
with James, however, this is not to say that epistemic relativism is one of Witt-
genstein’s explicit philosophical goals, let alone that he defends a relativistic 
theory of religious beliefs. Rather, as in James, epistemic relativism can be 
seen as a by-product of his deeply rooted and fundamental philosophical atti-
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tudes, namely, pluralism, anti-reductionism, anti-dogmatism. Of course, epis-
temic relativism is, in both Wittgenstein and James, a contingent by-product 
of their pluralism and anti-reductionism, for in principle one can be a pluralist 
and an anti-reductionist without being a relativist, or so it seems; nonetheless, 
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